characters ¹ PDF, DOC, TXT or eBook ✓ Bertrand Russell
I should have read this book before reading some of the philosophy books I've recently read.
It was hard to fathom how Bishop Berkeley came up with his views on idealism, until I read about similar ideas in Buddhism (cittamatra) in another book I'm reading.
This is a fascinating subject and I will be reading more. Bertrand explains concepts well, but I still wonder whether a good editor would make the book easier to read, as some of the sentences are long and complicated. Philosophy, History, Social Sciences به مانند دیگر آثار این فیلسوف گرانقدر، این کتاب هم تا صفحه آخر کاری میکنه که از خواندن مسائل فلسفی فقط و فقط لذت ببرید، خبری از واژه ها و حتی جملات قلمبه سلمبه ای که در کتب فلاسفه دیگر ( به غیر از آرتور شوپنهاور بزرگ ) میخواندید، نیست
مهمتر از همه اینکه در این کتاب، راسل بیشتر تلاش کرده تا موضوعاتی که به ماده و حقیقت و معرفت، مربوط هستش رو برای شما دوستان اهل مطالعه، شفاف سازی کنه و به بهترین نحو ممکن شرح بده و در مورد چرت و پرت هایی مثل، مسائل ما بعد الطبیعه و خیلی از موضوعات غیر عقلی و دینی که برخی از به اصطلاح فلاسفه از آنها سخن به میان آوردن، اصلا در این کتاب ازش صحبتی به میان نیامده که همین موضوع این کتاب رو در شاخه کتب ارزشمند فلسفی قرار میده
با اینکه جناب آقای بزرگمهر در ترجمه از برخی از واژه های دشوار، بهره بردن ولی بنده شخصا از خواندن بخش 8، 12 و 14 ، این کتاب واقعا لذت بردم، در بخش دوازدهم، به بهترین شکل ممکن راستی و دروغ رو از بعد فلسفی، توضیح داده
پیروز باشید و ایرانی
Philosophy, History, Social Sciences Turns out that philosophy has many problems Philosophy, History, Social Sciences Bertrand Russell is such a gentleman. He writes in lucid, clear prose filled with insight and occasional brilliance. He manages to compress enormous, complex debates into just a few paragraphs, and belies an encyclopedic knowledge of Western philosophy. The book is a gem, and sparkles with subtlety and charm.
But gentlemen can be dry. His prose marches forward but never leaps and dances, his mind is a logical machine impervious to emotion, his philosophy is not a philosophy of life and art, but of knowledge and truth. He has prostrated himself on the altar of logic, and bathed his spirit in the eternal light of rationality. To be a philosopher, for him, is to be a citizen of the universe, to free one’s mind from the ‘shackles’ of custom and history through purgative contemplation. It all sounds very nice.
Really, though, we do have some profound thinking here. Russell is asking a basic question, “what is the nature of knowledge?” Added to this is, “what can we know?” and “how can we know it?” Of course, these are tricky questions and it is impossible to give airtight answers. Russell, however, manages to give the reader a satisfying montage of the many ways these questions have been answered, as well as his own attempt. Characteristic of our gentleman, he upholds the view of the common man and defends the usual, accepted view of knowledge. But, if he did this in a common way, we wouldn’t be talking about him, would we?
Philosophy, History, Social Sciences این کتاب راسل که بی شک یکی از بهترین کتابهای اوست سالهاست که به عنوان یکی از کتاب های مقدماتی فلسفه و برای آشنایی با فلسفه مورد توجه اهالی فلسفه قرار گرفته است و در واقع به یک اثر کلاسیک تبدیل شده است. با این حال شاید این کتاب برای کسی که آشنایی قبلی با فلسفه ندارد سنگین و تا حدی خسته کننده باشد. به ویژه این روزها که کتابهای بسیار ساده تر و جذاب تری برای آشنایی با فلسفه نوشته شده اند. با این حال این کتاب هم جایگاه خاص خود را در آشنایی با فلسفه دارد و یکی از منابعی است ک هر دانشجوی فلسفه باید حداقل یکبار مطالعه کند.
در مورد ترجمه این کتاب هم با توجه به اینکه بسیاری از دانشجویان فلسفه از این کتاب به عنوان متنی برای مقابله ترجمه فارسی با متن اصلی انگلیسی استفاده میکنند لا��م دانستم که یادآوری کنم که به هر حال علی رغم تلاش مرحوم بزرگمهر، ترجمه این کتاب اشتباهات نسبتا زیادی دارد، که بی شک بخش بزرگی از آنها به زمانِ ترجمه کتاب برمیگردد و نبود امکانات مناسب و دانش زبانی کافی در آن زمان. Philosophy, History, Social Sciences
O introducere în filosofie redactată cu o admirabilă limpezime.
Bertrand Russell prezintă succint 13 probleme filosofice. Cele mai multe sînt de ordin gnoseologic (credibilitatea datelor senzoriale, inducția, cunoașterea nemijocită și cunoașterea prin descriere etc.).
Pentru filosoful englez, problemele sînt mai importante decît soluțiile pe care le-au primit de-a lungul timpului. Soluțiile diferă de la un filosof la altul (definiția adevărului s-a schimbat de zeci de ori, pînă la concluzia lui Rorty că adevărul nu poate fi definit), dar problemele rămîn. Tocmai aceste întrebări venerabile ne arată că trăim într-o lume cel puțin stranie. Filosofia încearcă să transforme banalul în ceva demn de interesul nostru. Ne învață cum să ne cultivăm curiozitatea, atitudinea critică, facultatea de a ne mira și, mai cu seamă, ne învață cum să punem la îndoială „adevărurile primite de-a gata”. Mintea noastră e plină de „adevăruri” primite de la mai-știutori, filosofia ne arată cum s-o golim (un exemplu poate fi găsit în Meditațiile... lui Descartes) și ce să punem în loc. Pentru Russell, voința de a te îndoi e mult mai importantă decît voința de a crede (a se vedea articolul a lui William James).
Așadar, la ce bun filosofii și argumentele lor plicticoase? Nu cunosc un răspuns mai bun, mai convingător, decît cel formulat de Bertrand Russell în capitolul final:
„De fapt, importanța filosofiei trebuie căutată în mare măsură tocmai în incertitudinea ei. Omul care nu a învăţat nici un dram de filosofie trece prin viaţă încătuşat în prejudecăţi derivate din simţul comun, din convingerile obişnuite ale epocii sau naţiei sale şi din convingerile (beliefs) pe care şi le-a însuşit fără cooperarea sau consimţămîntul raţiunii sale. Pentru un astfel de om, lumea tinde să fie precisă, finită, banală; obiectele obişnuite nu ridică nici un fel de întrebări, iar posibilităţile nefamiliare sînt respinse cu dispreţ. Dimpotrivă, de îndată ce începem să filosofăm, descoperim... că pînă şi cele mai obişnuite lucruri ridică probleme la care se pot da numai răspunsuri foarte incomplete. Deşi filosofia este incapabilă să ne spună cu certitudine care este adevăratul răspuns la îndoielile pe care le ridică, ne poate sugera multe posibilităţi care ne lărgesc orizontul gîndirii şi o eliberează de tirania obişnuinţei. Astfel, dacă pe de-o parte ea diminuează sentimentul nostru de certitudine cu privire la ce sînt lucrurile, pe de altă parte ea sporeşte mult cunoaşterea noastră despre ce pot fi ele; ea alungă dogmatismul oarecum arogant al acelora care nu au călătorit în regiunea îndoielii eliberatoare şi menţine vie capacitatea noastră de a ne mira, prezentîndu-ne lucrurile obişnuite dintr-o perspectivă neobişnuită” (pp.139-140).
P. S. Din păcate, traducerea acestui volum lasă de dorit. Philosophy, History, Social Sciences The Problems of Philosophy was written in 1912 as an early attempt by its author to create a brief and accessible guide to the problems of philosophy. Bertrand Russell is considered to be one of the founders of analytic philosophy, and is also widely held to be one of the 20th century's premier logicians. He is generally thought to be one of the most important philosophers of the past two hundred years. Extremely prolific and influential, he was awarded the Nobel prize for literature in 1950. Not only was he a leading philosopher with a long and distinguished career, but during his life he was a prominent figure in various political and social causes, such as nuclear disarmament. He remained politically active almost to the end of his life, writing to and exhorting world leaders to actions, and lending his name to various causes. He was a passionate and remarkable man with a huge intellect.
But was he the best person to write an introduction to philosophy for the novice? Possibly not. Bertrand Russell was a philosopher, not a teacher. Ironically, he may perhaps have been just too interested in his subject to write a primer in philosophy. This work seems to fall between several stools. In part it is a survey of western philosophy, briefly summarising those philosophers he considers to have contributed the most to philosophy. He starts by introducing the crux of the important philosophical theories of Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753), who posed the question, what is the difference between appearance and reality? Russell maintains that we must differentiate between sensation, sense-data and matter, to be clear. But the question posed by Berkeley was, Is there any such thing as matter? His final answer to this was that matter is merely, an idea in the mind of God, who then allows us to experience it with our sensations. Berkeley, an Anglo-Irish philosopher, is remembered along with John Locke and David Hume as one of the three most famous British Empiricists. They maintained that all our knowledge is derived from experience. Berkeley's primary achievement was the advancement of the theory he called immaterialism or idealism, considering that the physical world only exists while it is being perceived.
The reason for Russell to begin this book here, is clearly historical. Berkeley forms the basis for much of present-day philosophical enquiry. But it must be said that his conclusions (which Russell kindly goes on to point out are flawed) seem very alien to a modern mind. In a later section Russell details what he calls Bishop Berkeley's fallacy. He says that there is a confusion between the 2 meanings of idea. Berkeley makes the word to refer both to the acts of apprehension, and also to the things apprehended. It is vitally important to make a distinction between the act and the object, Russell says, claiming that,This is the true analysis of Berkeley's argument and the ultimate fallacy upon which it rests.
Russell then introduces Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, (1646-1716), a German philosopher and mathematician whose contention was that matter is a colony or collection of souls. The theories seem to be becoming even more abstruse and drifting off into the realms of metaphysics rather than introducing us to develop a clear method of thought and analysis. Perhaps that too was in Russell's mind, as he skims lightly through Leibniz's theories, reminding both himself and the reader of his primary task with this book, Philosophy, if it cannot answer so many questions as we would wish, has at least the power of asking questions which increase the interest of the world, and show the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of daily life.
We are now back on track as Russell introduces Descartes (1596-1650), the founder of modern Philosophy. René Descartes was a French philosopher, mathematician, and writer who spent most of his life in the Dutch Republic. He invented the method of systematic doubting. Russell says of Descartes, He would believe nothing which he did not see quite clearly and distinctly to be true. If it was possible to doubt it, then he would doubt until he saw reason to not doubt it. His contention was that the most subjective things, are the most certain, I think, therefore I am. Both Descartes and Leibniz were rationalists. They claimed that in addition to what we know by experience, there are certain innate ideas and innate principles, which we know independently of experience. Russell again lets us know what he thinks, saying that logical principles are an example of this, being known to us and not provable by experience, since all proof presupposes them. In this, he says, the rationalists were in the right.
He then moves on to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) a German (Prussian) philosopher, who took the rationalists views and developed them further. Before Kant, all knowledge was thought to be analytic, in that the predicate is obtained by merely analysing the subject. All a priori judgements were thought to be like this. The law of contradiction (that something can not at the same time have and not have a certain property) covered everything. Hume, who preceded Kant, had disagreed, saying that many so-called analytic cases - especially cause and effect - were really synthetic. Whereas the rationalists had thought that the effect could be logically deduced from the cause if only we had sufficient knowledge, Hume maintained that this is not so. He thought nothing could therefore be known a priori about the connection of cause and effect. Kant took this a step further. Not only cause and effect, but but all arithmetic and geometry he considered is synthetic, not analytic. This is because no analysis of the subject will reveal the predicate. For example, 7+5=12 . But 7 and 5 have to be put together to make 12. The idea of 12 is not contained in them, and neither is it contained in the idea of putting them together. Therefore all pure Maths, although a priori, is synthetic. As well as the observation that all a priori knowledge does not have to be analytic, Russell says Kant recognised the importance of the theory of knowledge.
We are told that when Kant came along his theories were a reversal in the philosophical orthodoxy. A relationship had previously been thought to pertain between the object analysed, and the subject that analyses it. Truth or reality, was in the external world. Kant differentiated between the physical object - or what he termed the thing in itself and our own nature - what Russell called the sense-data. The difference came when Kant regarded the material of sensation as due to the object. Russell explains that he thought, What we supply is the arrangement in space and time. So all our sense-data, he thought, result from our own natures. The thing in itself is essentially unknowable. What is known is our experience of the object, which Kant calls the phenomenon, or a joint product of us and the thing in itself. In this way he tried to harmonise the rationalists with the empiricists.
Unexpectedly, Russell then goes back to Classical Greece, to Plato (427-347 BC). Russell says, relations (relationships) are different from physical objects, from our minds and also from sense-data. This conceptual link leads him back to Plato's theory of ideas, or forms - the idea of finding the pure essence of something, eg whiteness. They are not in a mind - but just an idea eg justice. Russell says, It is eternally itself, immutable and indestructible. Plato's world is supra-sensible. Russell says that, The only true world for Plato is the world of ideas. This has been developed into many mystical theories, which Russell does not go into, having decided that they are beyond the scope of this book. Plato's theory of forms, he says led to later theories of universals. Russell calls abstract ideas universals.
At this point Russell seems to distance himself from previous philosophical schools and there follow several interesting chapters which detail Russell's own theories to do with knowledge of truths and knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description form knowledge of things (which exist). He further subdivides knowledge by acquaintance into acquaintance by sense-data, memory, introspection, and (probably, he says) by self, or that which is aware of these things. Then there is acquaintance with universals, or general ideas. A universal of which we are aware he calls a concept. He differentiates between universals and particulars, saying that descriptions always start from particulars with which we are acquainted, but, In logic, on the contrary, where we are concerned not merely with what does exist, but with whatever might or could exist or be, no reference to actual particulars is involved. In this way, knowledge by descriptions enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience.
Russell then gives a detailed explanation of the principle of induction. Although Hume did a lot of work on inductive reasoning, and the theory dates back to ancient times, Russell seems to have abandoned telling the reader the the historical background to these theories, and is keen to go into the logical analysis of them. When applying the principle of induction, we make a series of observations and infer a new claim based on them. It is to do with the number of times something has been observed to be associated with something else, but never found separately, dissociated from that thing. The greater the number of cases in which two have been associated, the greater the probability that they will be associated in a new case in which one of them is known to be present. He goes on to observe that in our daily lives we tend to apply the inductive principle as a matter of course. All our conduct is based on associations which have worked in the past, and which we therefore regard as likely to work in the future; and this likelihood is dependent for its validity upon the inductive principle. The general principles of science, such as the belief in the reign of law, and the belief that every event must have a cause, are as completely dependent upon the inductive principle as are the beliefs of daily life.
Russell then introduces more tools of the trade. The inductive principle is a logical principle, but so are self-evident logical principles which we employ in our laws of thought. These are the law of identity (whatever is, is), the law of contradiction, (nothing can both be and not be), and the law of excluded middle (everything must either be or not be.) He also takes account of intuitive knowledge, if it is consistently verifiable by the inductive principle and coherence, although he makes the point that it can easily merge into probable opinion. What we firmly believe, if it is true, is called knowledge, provided it is either intuitive or inferred (logically or psychologically) from intuitive knowledge from which it follows logically. What we firmly believe, if it is not true, is called error. What we firmly believe, if it is neither knowledge not error, and also what we believe hesitatingly, because it is, or is derived from, something which has not the highest degree of self-evidence, may be called probable opinion. Thus the greater part of what would commonly pass as knowledge is more or less probable opinion.
Approaching the end of his overview, Russell introduces the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), a major figure in idealism. Hegel's view was that everything short of the whole is fragmentary, and incapable of existing without the complement supplied by the rest of the world. A metaphysician can see the whole of reality in outline from one piece or fragment of it. To a reader, this may feel as though we are back where we started, with Berkeley. Hegel asserts that if we think of something, its incompleteness provides us with questions. Then by hypothesising and forming a new, more complete theory which answers these (or at least presents fewer contradictions) this is the synthesis of the original idea and its antithesis. This will still not be wholly complete, so the process is repeated, until the absolute idea is revealed, which describes absolute reality as one views the whole. God sees an eternal perfect unchanging spiritual unity. Russell says, Hegel reaches the conclusion that Absolute Reality forms one single harmonious system, not in space or time, not in any degree evil, wholly rational, and wholly spiritual. Any appearance to the contrary, in the world we know, can be proved logically...to be entirely due to our fragmentary piecemeal view of the universe.
Russell maintains that he will not go into metaphysics but confine himself to the philosophy of knowledge (epistemology). Frustratingly though, as soon as Russell attempts to present a simple version of other philosophers' views, he cannot help but put his own slant on their views. Sometimes this is overt, and he will happily say where (in his opinion) the earlier philosopher got it right - or wrong - and why. But he frequently forgets his audience. As well as struggling with the new definitions and new concepts, the reader is trying to disentangle what is an earlier view and what Russell's.
In the course of his overview of historical philosophical standpoints, Russell observes, Whoever wishes to become a philosopher must learn not to be frightened by absurdities. That is good advice for a new philosopher, particularly one in the 21st century. In many ways this book represented the philosophical orthodoxy at the time of writing, but some early theories must have seemed almost as remote to readers then as they are to us now. When a reader keeps being distracted by doubts, to think that they don't understand a position such as Berkeley's Mind of God, the truth may well be that they just don't agree with it! But it can be the hardest discipline for this reason, that the budding philosopher has to continually suspend their disbelief in a theory. But in general, as a first attempt to get to grips with an unfamiliar and intellectually rigorous subject, this historical focus is a distraction. What a newcomer needs is the tools for the job. Philosophy, like any other academic discipline, has its own terminology. Also, words such as innate which have a meaning in psychology, have an entirely different meaning in philosophy. Empiricist and rationalist have also been appropriated by philosophy to have very specific meanings, which are at variance with their everyday ones.
Russell tries to introduce the correct approach to tackling philosophical problems; to both define the terms and the analytical method to lay the foundations for further philosophical studies. However, he has to spend an inordinate amount of time in defining his terms, explaining the nice and extremely subtle distinctions before any headway can be made. He uses simplistic words such as so-and-so, and the sentences end up as incredibly convoluted, with many clauses and subclauses. Several times a diagrammatic representation would have made something a lot clearer. His search for clarity is a big part of why Russell's writing in this volume seems so convoluted and wordy. Because of Russell's enthusiasm for his subject, he delights in presenting his own viewpoint at every turn. The reader might find that Russell has forgotten that he is dealing with newcomers to the field, and presupposes a greater knowledge, forgetting that he has never used a term (such as synthetic) in its philosophical sense before. The reader may feel by the end that they have read the book a dozen times, back and forth, to accurately abstract its meaning
Basically, Russell is trying to come at the problem from two different angles, and covering too much ground. He mistakenly thinks that by interjecting an overview of the main philosophical movements, that will make the book more interesting. It does not; it is overly ambitious. It makes it even more dense, and should probably have been a completely separate work. It is clear that Russell is trying very hard to make the book accessible, as he is doing when he puts in his little jokes about earwigs and breakfast. But simplicity is the key.
The final chapters of the book make Russell's own case for studying philosophy as an academic discipline. He maintains that we do not study philosophy to discover definite answers to questions, but for the questions themselves. This book itself needs to be read with a certain historical perspective; it may once have been a core text, but advances in scientific areas such as quantum physics, which was in its infancy when Russell was writing this, may have made certain theories of philosophy redundant. Russell acknowledges this fact himself, Philosophy aims at...the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences...from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices and beliefs... As soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be philosophy, and becomes a separate science.
A much earlier example of this lies in the studies by Ancient Greeks such as Aristotle, of what they called Natural Philosophy, but what we from our later perspective call Science. It seems strange to study an area in which once the answers are evident the earlier reasonings become redundant. It is a task which is intellectually rigorous and never obvious, but essentially frustrating. Russell does however, provides a perfect justification for such a tough task, While diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they might be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.
Perhaps it would be preferable to have more knowledge of these commonly discussed philosophical areas before reading this book. One possible approach to this book may be to read around each chapter, and then come back to this book for Russell's views on it. Or if it is read as a sort of revision of lengthier works, it may be that it can then be properly appreciated. It may also be an ideal book for someone who wants to get back into studying the subject and needs reminding of the main areas and schools of thought. But for anyone completely new to the area and wanting an introduction to analytical philosophy, there is probably a much simpler book available nowadays.
The lasting impression given is that Bertrand Russell is just far too interested in his subject, to the point of being frustrated by his own book. He is having difficulty in restraining himself from going into each area in great detail. Also, areas he does not want to consider, he refers to sketchily and then quickly moves on without defining them properly. But this is a hopeless way to write for a beginner to read. Concepts have to be explained, or not referred to at all! In the final analysis, a primer of philosophy would perhaps be more accessibly written by a teacher of philosophy. Philosophy, History, Social Sciences The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell
The Problems of Philosophy is a 1912 book by Bertrand Russell, in which Russell attempts to create a brief and accessible guide to the problems of philosophy. Focusing on problems he believes will provoke positive and constructive discussion, Russell concentrates on knowledge rather than metaphysics: If it is uncertain that external objects exist, how can we then have knowledge of them but by probability. There is no reason to doubt the existence of external objects simply because of sense data.
تاریخ نخستین خوانش: شانزدهم ماه آوریل سال 1974 میلادی
عنوان: مسائل فلسفه؛ نویسنده: برتراند راسل؛ مترجم: احمد اردوبادی؛ تهران، معرفت، 1336، در 188 ص؛ عنوان: روی جلد: مسائل فلسفی برتراند راسل؛ موضوع: فلسفه - فیلسوفان - مفاله ها و خطابه ها از نویسندگان بریتانیایی - سده 20 م
عنوان: مسائل فلسفه؛ نویسنده: برتراند راسل؛ مترجم: منوچهر بزرگمهر؛ تهران، خوارزمی، 1347، در 200 ص؛ چاپ پنجم: 1389؛ شابک: 9789644871290؛ چاپ دیگر 1390؛ عنوان: روی جلد: مسائل فلسفی برتراند راسل؛ موضوع: فلسفه - فیلسوفان - مفاله ها و خطابه ها از نویسندگان بریتانیایی - سده 20 م
نقل از متن مقدمه: در این مختصر بحث خود ر�� منحصر به آن قسمت از مسائل فلسفه ساخته ام که درباره آنها میتوان اظهار نظر مثبت کرد زیرا در یک چنین کتابی جای بحث و انتقاد منفی نیست. از این جهت بحث معرفت از بحث وجود و مابعدالطبیعه به معنی اخص بیشتر آمده است و بعضی مطالب که فیلسوفان دیگر به تفصیل از آن سخن گفته اند به اختصار برگزار شده و حتی حذف گردیده است. در نوشتن کتاب از آثار منتشر نشده «جرج ادوارد مور» و «جان مینارد کینز» استفاده کرده ام از اولی درباره ی رابطه میان داده های حس، و اعیان واقعیه، و از دومی در باب احتمال و استقراء. همچنین از انتقادات و پیشنهادهای استاد «گیلبرت موری» تمتع بسیار حاصل کرده ام. پایان نقل از مقدمه. ا. شربیانی Philosophy, History, Social Sciences I studied Philosophy years ago before moving on to Physics. Recently, my dad (now retired) announced that he might head back to uni to study philosophy to keep his brain ticking over, and I decided to reread my copy of this before loaning it to him as a nice intro, or at least relatively nice - It’s essentially a philosopher’s job to try to be the fussiest and most pedantic person on the planet as far as humanly possible. Still, you can hardly ask for a better guide through the territory than Bertrand Russell, a practical Everyman in a field full of seriously strange people (philosophy really should come with a mental health warning).
Reading this now through more of a scientific lens, certain ideas hit harder. Throughout the book, Russell essentially makes the case that it’s not the job of Philosophy (or within its abilities) to ascertain absolute truths about the world, but rather, assess our ‘state of knowledge’ of things and produce a hierarchy or framework, based on the value of each state.
This isn’t so different from the Bayesian view, widely and increasingly used in astronomy and many other areas of science, which (though more fleshed out and with a complete mathematical framework) can essentially be boiled down to, ‘truth or falsity isn’t absolute, rarely 1 or 0, but exists on a continuum between them’. This comes in handy when comparing theoretical models (among other things) and is a lesson that could stand to be more widely learned in all walks of life in the fight against tribalism and bias. When we adopt a dogmatic view of the world, we assume our state of ignorance is 0, when it could be 0.3 or 0.648 or 0.999.
That said, there are places in which its views are out of date, for example, discussing the ‘order of events’ as being absolute even while their appearance may vary spatially is half right, as relativity teaches us that our frame of reference can significantly affect our perception not only of how events appear, but also the order in which they occur.
If you’re a beginner, any philosophy book you’ll encounter will seem at least slightly laborious as the writer tries to work in detail through every assumption, define every term, address Cartesian doubt for the millionth time and so on, but at around 100 pages and giving a brief overview of many of the problems of his day which are still relevant now, this is a perfectly good place to start. It’s also quite funny in places, especially when addressing other philosophers. There’s no better kind of bitchiness than when one philosopher criticises another.
To put it in his own words:
“Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answer can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination, and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.”
Amen, brother. Philosophy, History, Social Sciences Plato, in the Symposium, was perhaps the first person to consider the question of the unliked review. If a review never receives any votes, can it truly be said to exist? This problem has tormented many of the world's greatest philosophers. Bishop Berkeley's famous answer is that God reads and likes every review, hence they all exist. Even at the time, this was not universally considered satisfactory; Rousseau's reply, le compte de Dieu est privé, is widely quoted as the standard objection.
By the time of Nietzsche, the theory was under serious attack. In a passage that the publisher insisted on removing from the first edition of Beyond Good and Evil, and which was only reinstated after a lengthy court case, the author argues that there is no clear evidence that God is a member of Goodreads in the first place; even if He was once a member, He could easily have left without anyone realizing.
Wittgenstein, in The Stripey, Off-White Notebook With A Gravy Stain On The Bottom Left (unpublished during his lifetime), considered that the question was not well-posed. The sentence God liked my review is syntactically ill-formed according to the strict rules of [continued for another 14 pages]
Philosophy, History, Social Sciences
Bertrand Russell was one of the greatest logicians since Aristotle, and one of the most important philosophers of the past two hundred years. As we approach the 125th anniversary of the Nobel laureate's birth, his works continue to spark debate, resounding with unmatched timeliness and power.
The Problems of Philosophy, one of the most popular works in Russell's prolific collection of writings, has become core reading in philosophy. Clear and accessible, this little book is an intelligible and stimulating guide to those problems of philosophy which often mistakenly lead to its status as too lofty and abstruse for the lay mind. Focusing on problems he believes will provoke positive and constructive discussion, Russell concentrates on knowledge rather than metaphysics, steering the reader through his famous 1910 distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, and introducing important theories of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Hume, Locke, Plato, and others to lay the foundation for philosophical inquiry by general readers and scholars alike.
With a new introduction by John Perry, this valuable work is a perfect introduction to the field and will continue to stimulate philosophical discussion as it has done for nearly forty years.
The Problems of Philosophy