So I had to read this for my class A Prehistory of Affect: Reading the Passions. It was a pretty panicked situation: I got randomly chosen to do a 30 minute presentation on this text... in the first week of my Masters. I had one week to read the Enquiry and prepare my presentation. It was incredibly stressful. I've never read philosophy, I'm very unfamiliar with the 18th century, and I had been out of school for year and a half. Talk about being kicked back into gear.
I don't know how to rate this text. It's pretty readable which was nice and a lot of the ideas are interesting and make you think.. but then a lot of the ideas are cyclical and redundant or just kind of silly. Im giving it three stars because that's what it conjures up in my mind, but I'm not super sure what I'm judging that off of, honestly. It's a text that is more about the discussion it creates rather than a i liked it/i didn't like it binary.
PS: The presentation went super well! I got an A! YAY! 9781411428713 I had seen so many references to Hume's Enquiry that I almost thought I had read it; but, when I actually got around to opening the book, I found as usual that things were not quite as I had imagined. I was not surprised by his relentless scepticism, or by his insistence on basing all reasoning on empirical evidence. These qualities, after all, have become proverbial. I was, however, surprised to find that I hadn't correctly grasped the essence of his argument concerning the nature of knowledge. In case you are as poorly informed as I was, let me summarise it here.
Hume's position is wonderfully simple. He asks what grounds we have for supposing that multiple repetitions of an experiment justify us in inferring a necessary law. If we note, on many occasions, that hot objects burn our hands when we touch them, what logical reason do we have for assuming that we should not touch the next candle flame we happen to see?
The answer is that we have no logical grounds at all for making such an inference. Of course, as a matter of observed fact, we do assume, after a small number of trials, that touching hot objects will hurt us. Hume says this is nothing to do with logic; we are simply designed in such a way that we cannot help being influenced by our experience to adopt such rules. As he points out, many other living creatures do the same. It is impossible to believe that a dog or a horse is performing any kind of logical deduction when they learn to avoid touching naked flames. They simply acquire the habit of behaving in this way. The most economical explanation of what we see is that human beings are doing the same thing.
A mountain of discussion has accumulated since Hume published his book, and it would be presumptuous of me to give my opinions when so many extremely clever people have already done so. I am, however, struck by something I have noticed in the course of my professional career. I have worked in Artificial Intelligence and related subjects since the early 80s, and during that period the field has suffered a profound change. In 1980, most AI research was related to logic. People assumed that the notion of intelligence was in some essential way based on the notion of deduction. Making machines intelligent was a question of making them capable of performing the right kinds of logical inferences. This tempting approach was, unfortunately, a resounding failure.
Somewhere towards the end of the last century, a different way of looking at things started to become fashionable, and quickly gained ground. Instead of thinking about logic, people began more and more to think about probability. They collected data and extracted various kinds of statistical regularities. The new AI systems made no attempt to think logically; their decisions were based on associations acquired from their experience. At first, the AI community was scornful, but it was soon found that data-driven systems worked quite well. They made stupid mistakes sometimes; but so did the logic-based systems, and the mechanical logicians tended to make more stupid mistakes. They could reason, but they had no common sense. Today, data-driven systems have taken over the field, and the approach has been shown to work well for many problems which had once been considered impossible challenges. Particularly striking successes have been notched up in machine translation, speech recognition, computer vision, and allied fields.
If David Hume came back today, I have no idea whether he'd be offered a chair at a philosophy department. But I'm fairly sure that Google would be interested in hiring him.
9781411428713 دیوید هیوم همچون لاک و بارکلی از فلاسفه‌ی تجربه‌گراست. این فلاسفه معتقدند که تجربه منبع اصلی معرفت و شناخت است.
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فلسفه‌ی غامض، فلسفه‌ی واضح
هیوم فلسفه را به دو قسم تقسیم میکند: غامض، واضح. معتقد است که هر دو موردِ نیاز هستند. اگر فلسفه‌ی غامض به صورت تخصصی نباشد، فلسفه‌ی واضح شکل نخواهد گرفت یا شکوفا نخواهد شد. فلسفه از نظر هیوم باید کاربردی باشد و در خدمت بشر. فلسفه‌ی کاربردی همان فسلفه‌ی واضح است که توسط عموم مردم قابل فهم و بکارگیری است. هیوم میگوید برای عموم می‌نویسد و به راستی چنین میکند. فلسفه‌ی مابعدالطبیعه از نظر هیوم فلسفه‌‌ای غامض و مهملی است که بیراهه می‌رود و نتیجه‌ی غلط فلسفیدن است.
منشأ ایده‌ها
به عقیده‌ی هیوم، هر فکر و ایده‌ای، چه بسیط و مرکب از تجربه می‌آید. ایده‌های مرکب، حاصل پیوستن ایده‌های بسیط هستند. در نتیجه هیچ ایده‌ی فطری‌ای وجود ندارد و در حقیقت فکر و روان انسان‌ها پس از تولد همچون لوح‌های سفیدی هستند که تجربه بر آنها چیزها می‌نویسد.
ارتباط ایده‌ها
ارتباط ایده‌ها به سه روش ممکن می‌شود: شباهت، مجاورت در زمان یا مکان، و علیت.
موضوع کاوش‌های بشری: حساب و هندسه، امور واقع
موضوعات کاوش‌های بشری دو نوع هستند. یکی «روابطِ بین ایده‌ها» که از جنس استدلال برهانی هستند و در حساب و هندسه کاربرد دارد. در این نوع برای استدلال و نتیجه‌گیری تنها نیاز به کنش‌های ذهنی دارد. نوع دوم کاوش در «امور واقع» است. کاوش در این مورد به کمک استدلال انسانی شکل می‌گیرند و مبتنی بر علیت است. تجربه، این نوع کاوش را خوراک می‌دهد.
غریز‌ه‌ی استدلال
استدلال تجربی گونه‌ای قوه‌ای مکانیکی یا غریزی‌ست که ناخودآگاه آن را به کار می‌بریم.
علیت چیست؟
علیت از نظر هیوم قابل اثبات نیست. یعنی ما هرگز قادر به کشف رابطهای ملموس بین علت و معمول نیستیم. بلکه تنها از تکرار اتفاقات هم‌زمان و براساس عادت و تجربه حدس می‌زنیم که رابطهای وجود دارد و اسم آن را رابطه‌ی علّی می‌گذاریم. به عنوان نمونه اگر تنها یک بار سقوط شیئی را از بالا به پایین ببینیم، نمی‌توانیم چیزی را تصور کنیم یا تشخیص دهیم به نام جاذبه. ولی اگر این اتفاق تکرار شود، فکر می‌کنیم علت را یافته‌ایم و آن را با در ارتباط با جسم و زمین، «جاذبه» می‌نامیم. وقتی تنها منبع شناخت ما تجربه است، نمیتوان مطمئن بود که رویدادهایی که تجربه کرده‌ایم، تا همیشه در مورد موقعیت‌های مشابه یکسان اتفاق خواهد افتاد.
علیت، باور، احتمالات
علیت حاصل استدلال نیست، حاصل استنتاج است. «باور» حاصل اونس و عادت به تکرار تجربه‌‌های یکسان است. وقتی از احتمالات صحبت می‌کنیم، همچنان اتکای ما به تجربه و استنتاج است.
ضرورت
اگر چیزی به نام ارتباط «ارتباط ضروری» وجود داشته باشد، چنین ارتباطی غیرقابل شناخت است. زیرا هیچ وقت با تجربه‌ی پدیده‌ها قادر به مشاهده‌ی نیرو یا انرژی‌ای نخواهیم بود که ضرورتاً اتفاقی را ممکن می‌شود یا باید بشود.
معجزه
معجزات را نمیتوان پذیرفت [یا موجه نیست که بپذیریم] چون تنها از طریق گواهی دیگران به اطلاع ما می‌رسند. هر چقدر گواهی‌دهندگانِ رویدادها از لحاظ مکانی و زمانی از ما دورتر باشند، گواهی آنها غیرقابل اتکاتر است. معجزات معمولاً از فیلتر آگاهان و اندیشمندان گذر نکرده و در سرزمین مردمان نسبتاً جاهل روی داده‌اند. هیچ معجزه‌ای نیست که هم‌زمان توسط تمامِ مردمِ یک عصر، یا حتی تمام مردمانِ محل معجزه در آن عصر تایید شده باشد و مخالفی نداشته باشد. استدلال انسانی، استنتاج، و احتمالات به ما می‌گویند، هر قدر یک اتفاق نادرتر و خارق‌العاده‌تر باشد، کمتر پذیرفتنی‌ست. در امور روزمره اگر بعد از هزار بار مشاهده‌ی یک رویداد به شکلی خاص، یک بار آن اتفاق متفاوت روی دهد، به جای پذیرش یک رویداد خارق‌العاده، ابتدا به مشاهده‌ی خودمان شک می‌کنیم، یا سعی می‌کنیم بیشتر مداقه کنیم و احتمال می‌دهیم این بار شاید علتی دیگری در کار بوده است که از آن بی‌خبریم. اگر خودمان این اتفاق را متفاوت را مشاهده نکرده باشیم و تنها از طرف کسی گواهی شده باشد، به گواهی‌دهنده شک می‌کنیم. در مورد معجزات هم باید چنین کنیم.
صفات خدا
اگر بتوان علت را از یک معلول شناخت یا حدس زد، نهایتاً میتوان مشخصاتی را به علت نسبت داد که از طریق معلول قابل کشف باشد، نه فراتر از آن. ولی فیلسوفان مذهبی پا را از این فراتر می‌گذراند. نه فقط با مشاهده‌ی مخلوقات، خدا را به عنوان خالق کشف می‌کنند، بلکه صفات دیگری را هم مثل عدالت و هدفمندی را هم به آن منتسب می‌کنند. یک دلیل شاید این است که خود را جای خدا می‌گذارند. تصور می‌کنند، اگر آدمی چنین توانمند باشد که چنین چیزهایی را خلق کند، حتماً عادل است و از این کار هدفی دارد و الی آخر، پس فک�� می‌کنند که میتوان نتیجه گرفت که خدا هم چنین است.
انواع شکاکیت
هیوم انواع شکاکیت را بررسی میکند. شک دکارتی را مفید می‌داند ولی معتقد است که برخلاف ادعای دکارت، این شک همه‌جانبه و واقعی نیست. نمیتوان به همه چیز شک کرد و سپس یک نقطه‌ی آغازین و قابل اتکا را برای شروع پیدا کرد که بی‌شک از هر شکی به دور باشد و سپس به کشف امور دیگر پرداخت.
سپس شک افراطی را رد میکند. معتقد است که شک افراطی در بطن خود متناقض و مهمل است. اگر تلاش کنید که ثابت کنید همه چیز مشکوک است، شک خود را منکر شدید. چرا که مدعی هستید که «مشکوک بودن همه چیز» جای شک ندارد. این ��ک راه به جایی نمی‌برد و حتی امور روزمره هم با آن پیش نمی‌رود.
تنها چیزی که از نظر هیوم جای شک ندارد، ریاضی است. علت هم این است که در ریاضی همه‌ی واحدهای عددی با هم یکسان هستند. در نتیجه، مقایسه و نتیجه‌گیری ممکن است. ولی در امور واقع هیچ دو چیزی کاملاً یکسان نیستند و هیچ مقایسه و نتیجه‌ای نمی‌تواند دقیق و بی‌شک انجام گیرد.
امور کلی و جزئی
همه‌ی امور جزئی هستند. کلیات تنها نام‌هایی هستند برای امور جزئی که به شکلی شبیه هم هستند. همه‌ی علوم، علم به کلیات هستند.
به آتش بسپارید!
هیوم در تمام کتاب صبور است. ولی آن را طوفانی تمام میکند. میگوید هر کتابی در دست گرفتید چنین کنید: «باید بپرسیم آیا استدلالی مجرد مربوط به کمیت یا عدد را در بر دارد؟ آیا استدلالی آزمایشی مربوط به امر واقع و وجود را در بر دارد؟ نه. پس آن را به شعله‌های آتش بسپرید؛ زیرا جز سفسطه و توهم چیزی در بر نتواند داشت.»
- درباره‌ی ترجمه
مترجم در مقدمه میگوید که قصد دارد و بهتر است که به ساختار انگلیسی قرن هجدهمی هیوم وفادار باشد. این وفاداری به نفع خواننده تمام نشده است. در جملاتِ پرشماری، حتی ترتیب کلمات غریبه و انگلیسی هستند. به جای ساختارِ معمولِ فارسی جمله یعنی فاعل، مفعول و فعل، ساختار انگلیسی یعنی فاعل، فعل و مفعول به کار رفته است. متن بدون دلیل موجه، پیچیده و آزاردهنده شده است. حفظ ساختار اصلی متن و زیبایی نثر قدیمیِ هیوم، دلیلی‌ست که مترجم برای چنین ساختاری می‌آورد. به نظرم هدف اصلی از خواندن چنین کتابی، آگاهی نسبت به اندیشه‌ی هیوم است، نه لذت بردن از نثر آن. گرچه در نهایت نثر ترجمه‌شده، چندان لذتی را منتقل نمی‌کند.
ضمناً باز در همان مقدمه، مترجم گفته که قصد ندارد هیچ جا پاورقی بگذراد. هیچ بخشی از چیزهایی که معمولاً توقع داریم در پاورقی بیاید، نیامده است. انگلیسیِ هیچ اسمی، اطلاعات کتاب‌ها یا مکان‌هایی که در متن اشاره می‌شود، و هیچ چیز دیگری از زبان مترجم در پاورقی نیست. مترجم دلیل را سادگی متن می‌داند که آن را بی‌نیاز از شرح و توضیحات و پاورقی میکند. صحیح است که هیوم برای همگان و ساده می‌نویسد ولی دست‌کم در موارد فروانی، همچون انگلیسیِ نام‌ها، وجود پاورقی‌ها لازم بود و نبودشان، گرچه خوانش را ناممکن نمی‌سازد، همچنان نقص است.
خلاصه، حیف است که «کاوه لاجوردیِ» توانا، با دو انتخاب اشتباه که به راحتی قابل جلوگیری بود، کار باارزشش را دچار نقص‌هایی کرده است.
پی‌نوشت ۱:
پیشتر پلی‌لیستی از یوتیوب را پیشنهاد کرده بودم، که شامل ۸۱ جلسه‌ی تقریباً یک ساعته است از کلاس درسی درباره‌ی تاریخ فلسفه. این پلی‌لیست چنان با ارزش است که به بهانه‌ی هیوم‌خوانی دوباره می‌آورم‌اش:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KOO9c...
سه جلسه از این ویدئوها، مربوط به هیوم است.
پی‌نوشت ۲:
از همین کتاب شروع کردم به کمی خلاصه‌نویسی؛ خیلی خلاصه. در همان کتاب، در ابتدا یا انتهای بخش، چند خطی می‌نویسم. این مرور در حقیقت، از همان خط‌ها می‌آید. اگر نقصی داشت، خبرم کنید، چون به نیّت اینجا آمدن، نوشته نشده بوده‌اند. 9781411428713 Is it not uncertain whether the effect of my realizations about the disconnection of causes and effects is due to the cause of reading An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding? The most excellent definition of causation being if the first object had not been, the second never had existed is not true in this case since I, as with Hume, may have been able to realize this independently. It is said correlation does not entail causation, and reading Hume does not necessarily entail that it was the cause of me realizing the same ideas. It seems further experimentation will be necessary.
I submit that multiple individuals read An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding as the experimental group and have another group read randomly selected books as the control group. Then, let us have them take a reading comprehension test or perhaps have them submit reviews on some platform, call it notbadtexts.com, for comparison. Using tests of statistical significance, it will thus be able to be confirmed whether the effect of learning about the disconnection of causes and effects was indeed due to the cause of reading a book about such. I daresay this may be the most important scientific experiment on causality to ever be devised. It is imperative we test and confirm whether causal effects indeed lead to thoughts about causal effects, elsewise the entire scientific enterprise may currently be compromised.
Anyhow, the weather today was nice, and I look forward to supper.
Ah, right, but was it not also said A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence? Tis true, tis true... However, an experiment of such a kind would be of the highest order of evidence. Rather than theorizing the validity of those notions, such an experiment would finally make them become a matter of fact about matters of fact. For a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger.
We will then be able to compound our certainty by performing an experiment on the effects of reading about an experiment (a cause) on the effects of reading about the true nature of causality from a text called An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (another cause). Ad infinitum. Thus, a means has been established of having certainty about certainty, which is the greatest form of certainty.
Has thee Bayes been beaten? Has thy necessity of Kantian transcendental pure reason been admonished? 9781411428713 Hume is one of the best, most quotable and reasonable philosophers of all time. Besides Schopenhauer and maybe Plato, no one had a greater mind. He was not quite the lucid prosodist Arthur was, and not quite the poet Plato was, but when it comes to directing humanity away from superstition and toward rational thinking, maybe none have done as much. A friend of Rousseau's and a great historian to boot, David Hume's writings deserve our attention. 9781411428713
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding is the thesis of a thinker who was a scientist, psychologist, metaphysician, and skeptic who continues to fascinate contemporary minds. The product of both youthful fire and mature consideration, the Enquiry, contain[s] everything of Consequence relating to the understanding. In the face of skepticism, the Enquiry offered progress based on experience. In a time of dogmatism, the Enquiry dissected the basis of religious faith and delivered a still-powerful critique. It endeavors to be nothing less than the construction of an anatomy of human nature. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
Free download ☆ PDF, DOC, TXT or eBook è David Hume
Nothing is more free than the imagination of man.
David Hume (1711-1776), a Scottish philosopher and a radical and uncompromising empiricist, discusses epistemology in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748).
Hume's central argument is that knowledge cannot be attained through reasoning a priori and that ancient and modern philosophers are most guilty of this exaggerated claim. Instead, knowledge can only occur through experience and no conclusion can be drawn without the assistance of observation and experience through our senses, hence, nothing can be proved a priori.
Furthermore, Hume goes on to discuss how the experiences from our past can only act as suppositions for our future claims and that: These records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are so many collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science.
A concise and comprehensible read that I enjoyed and a philosophy that entirely shifts us away from metaphysics. This edition also includes Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh (1745) and An Abstract of A Treatise of Nature (1740). 9781411428713 دوستانِ گرانقدر، این کتاب یکی از سه کتابِ ارزشمندی است که از دلِ مطالبِ کتابِ اصلیِ زنده یاد <دیوید هیوم> بزرگترین فیلسوفِ تاریخ انگلستان، با عنوان در طبیع�� انسان بیرون آمده است که اینگونه برای ریویو نویسی من نیز ساده تر و بهتر است و میتوانم در مورد نوشته های دیگر از این فیلسوفِ خردگرا، برایتان بنویسم
عزیزانم، هدفِ <هیوم> در این کتاب این است تا ثابت کند که ایده ها در اصل تفاوتی با تجربیات ندارند. چراکه ایده هایِ پیچیده از ایده هایِ ساده تر بیرون می آیند و ایده هایِ ساده تر نیز از احساساتِ حسی به وجود می آیند
زنده یاد <هیوم> میگوید: وقتی ایده و کاری را میتوان آشکار و روشن دانست که درستیِ آن از راه تجربه اثبات گردد و به وسیلهٔ غریزه نمیتوان درستی موضوعی را اثبات نمود
سپس این مردِ بزرگ به موضوعِ وجودِ خدا و روح میپردازد و میگوید: از آنجایی که مردم نمیتوانند وجودِ خدا را با روش آزمایش و روش های علمی و خردگرایانه اثبات کنند و اثری از روح و خدا و موهومات دینی وجود ندارد، لذا دلیلی برای اعتقاد به خدا و چیزهای دیگری که توسطِ دینکاران به مردم وعده داده شده است، وجود ندارد
این فیلسوفِ بزرگ، توضیحاتش را با به کاربردنِ ابزاری همچون میکروسکوپ - تیغ - چنگال.. کامل میکند و اینگونه میگوید که ما باید همچون این سه ابزارِ کاری، در زندگی به درستی و راستی پی ببریم
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میکروسکوپ: برای فهم و درکِ یک ایده و نظرِ ارائه شده، باید آن ایده را به ایده هایِ ساده تری که اجزایِ سازندهٔ آن هستند جدا کرده و یک به یک مورد بررسی قرار دهیم
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تیغ: باید موهومات دینی و مذهبی و همینطور مسائل متافیزیکی که دلیل علمی و خردگرایانه برای توجیه آن وجود ندارد را به وسیلهٔ تیغ از زندگی و افکارمان بزداییم و آنها را بتراشیم
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چنگال: به وسیلهٔ چنگال میتوانیم حقایق را به دو بخش تقسیم کنیم... دستهٔ اولِ حقایق به این صورت است که برخی از ایده ها و نظرات همچون نظریاتِ درستِ ریاضی که بارها اثبات شده اند، اثباتِ آنها همیشگی خواهد بود و تردیدی در آنها وجود ندارد
دستهٔ دوم، راستی ها و درستی هایی هستند که از ابتدا در طبیعت و دنیا، همیشه روی داده اند و درستی آنها ثابت شده است
ما باید تنها به همین دو دسته از درستی ها که خردِ ما آنها را قبول کرده است و از راه دانش ثابت شده است، اعتقاد داشته باشیم
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امیدوارم این ریویو برای شما خردگرایان مفید بوده باشد
در ریویوهای دیگر سعی میکنم بیشتر به اندیشه های این فیلسوفِ بزرگ، بپردازم
<پیروز باشید و ایرانی> 9781411428713 Plumbing the Depths of the Human Mind
Attached Soundtrack :
Zoolook - Jean-Michel Jarre
Quotes:
'In short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment: the mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.'
'The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood.'
'The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain[...] attempt to demonstrate its falsehood.'
[later:]
'We have said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.'
'What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact? the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation? it may be replied in one word, Experience. But if we still carry on our sifting humour, and ask, What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? this implies a new question, which may be of more difficult solution and explication.'
'You say that the one proposition is an inference from the other. But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? To say it is experimental, is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what process of argument secures you against this supposition? My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied in the point; but as a philosopher, who has some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? We shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowledge.'
'Thus, according to these philosophers, every thing is full of God. Not content with the principle, that nothing exists but by his will, that nothing possesses any power but by his concession: They rob nature, and all created beings, of every power, in order to render their dependence on the Deity still more sensible and immediate. They consider not that, by this theory, they diminish, instead of magnifying, the grandeur of those attributes, which they affect so much to celebrate.'
'It may be said [...] that, if voluntary actions be subjected to the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter, there is a continued chain of necessary causes, preordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human creature. No contingency anywhere in the universe; no indifference; no liberty. While we act, we are, at the same time, acted upon.'
'[...] the experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves; and in its chief operations, is not directed by any such relations or comparisons of ideas, as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties. Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct, which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation, and the whole economy and order of its nursery.'
'It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority, which always attend received opinions.'
Also see:
Utilitarianism
Freedom from the Known
Divine Invasions: A Life of Philip K. Dick
Travels in Hyperreality
Nos ancêtres les Germains : les archéologues au service du nazisme
The Crowd
Propaganda
La Langue des medias : Destruction du langage et fabrication du consentement 9781411428713 S-a întîmplat să citesc Critica rațiunii pure în anul II de Facultate, cu mult înainte de a citi Cercetare asupra intelectului omenesc. Abia atunci am înțeles afirmația lui Immanuel Kant că „a fost trezit din somnul dogmatic” de Hume. Și tot atunci am observat, cu uimire, că întrebările la care a încercat să răspundă Immanuel Kant (chiar și ordinea lor) erau, în realitate, întrebările lui David Hume formulate în Cercetare... A.J. Ayer în consideră pe Hume „cel mai important filosof britanic”. Nu mă îndoiesc că este așa, deși ierarhiile nu prea au sens. Peste tot, atitudinea lui Hume este „sceptică”. Gînditorul scoțian a văzut în scepticism atitudinea cea mai potrivită în abordarea problemelor filosofice. Totul poate fi obiect de îndoială. Consideră că răspunsurile pe care el însuși le oferă trebuie privite măcar cu un dram de scepticism.
David Hume a fost un om moderat și amabil, vestit pentru noblețea și cumpătarea lui. Dar asta nu l-a împiedicat să adopte adeseori o atitudine polemică. Discuția lui cu privire la „miracole” a rămas clasică. Mai puțini știu însă că Hume (ca și Seneca, Montaigne sau Sir Thomas Browne) nu s-a ferit să recomande un soi de „incendiu al cărților”. Există cărți inutile: „Cînd parcurgem bibliotecile, pătrunși de aceste principii, ce prăpăd ar trebui să facem? Dacă luăm în mînă orice volum de teologie sau de metafizică de școală, bunăoară, să ne întrebăm: Conține el vreun raționament abstract privitor la cantitate sau număr? Nu. Conține oare el vreun raționament întemeiat pe experiență cu privire la fapte și existență? Nu. Încredințați-l atunci focului, căci nu poate conține nimic altceva decît sofisme și iluzii” (p.225).
Aș menționa două contribuții esențiale ale filosofului englez:
1. Din „este” nu poate fi dedus niciodată „trebuie”.
2. „Post hoc ergo propter hoc” este cel mai răspîndit sofism. Dacă un eveniment succede altuia asta nu înseamnă că este efectul celui dintîi... 9781411428713 I didn't particularly enjoy this book. Hume is both pretentious and self-indulgent. While he makes a good case for experience being a necessary prerequisite for knowing effect from cause, he also contradicts himself variously and accords to experience more authority than he accredits it in certain other parts of this book.
That a certain effect has happened numerous times before is no guarantee that it will happen again -true enough! Hume says that it is simply custom to credit any particular effect with empirical authority. But wait until he gets to the chapter on miracles; here he gives experience over arching authority to know exactly what nature and it's laws will give rise to. Hume argues that cause and effect are known only through experience and one experience will apply to other cause and effect occurrences when they are apparently similar. He admits that much of this cause/effect process occurs because of unintelligible secret powers that are inscrutable to reason. Whilst admitting that experience is more or less mere custom and admitting the inscrutability of secret processes, Hume undoes his argument and gauges the miraculous using the means he just put in doubtful standing! What an egregious error of logic; what a way to dig your own philosophical grave; to cast doubt on a particular method of reasoning and then endue it with absolute authority. Hume says no one has ever seen anyone rise from the dead anywhere, so presumes Hume who says that no occurrence is illogical that doesn't involve a contradiction. Hume presumes to use his customary experience to measure all events everywhere, regardless of whether he was present or not. He uses the example of an Indian disbelieving that water could become hard because of cold in his argument against miracles, when in fact it works against Hume. The example was to illustrate ignorance of physical laws that can seem miraculous when one has not experienced them. Same argument works against Hume. Hume thinks that a ship being suspended in air is a miracle; an example that is altogether ironic, given that in the 21st century we see jet airliners suspended in the air regularly. This would be a miracle to Hume, but all it really shows is Hume's 18th century ignorance of the principles of propulsion, aerodynamics and lift. Hume, as he admitted, has no means of knowing all natural laws and when and where they can be superseded because of other secret powers or laws coming into play. His chapter on miracles is a bit of a comical irony. Hume makes much of probability. A one thousand sided dye with nine hundred and ninety nine uniform sides with only one differentiated side figures in his argument regarding probability. It's an interesting analogy and example. Miracles by their very nature are not regular occurrences, just as the probability of one particular side appearing in a one thousand sided dye in a roll is not a regular occurrence. A miracle only has to happen once in experience to be an experimental fact. If it occurs even once, all arguments to the contrary are simply willful ignorance and, in Hume's case, pretentious sophistry.
The only thing that saves this book from a 2 star review is his chapter Of The Idea Of Necessary Connexion which I must admit was quite intriguing. If I ever re-read Hume, it will probably be only this chapter and little else. Hume, subsequently, became the darling of atheists and his arguments are often recycled by them ad nauseam still. This, once again, shows the ignorance of atheists and their tendency to cherry pick sources. Hume wasn't an atheist, if anything he was a deist; although, he seems to make some claims to Christian belief, which can only be seen as ridiculous given his above positions.
9781411428713
