Winner of the Fletcher Pratt Award and the Jefferson Davis Award
A companion volume to Army of the Heartland
Near the end of 1862 the Army of Tennessee began a long and frustrating struggle against overwhelming obstacles and ultimate defeat. Federal strength was growing, and after the Confederate surrender at Vicksburg, the total Union effort became concentrated against the Army of Tennessee. In the face of these external military problems, the army was also plagued with internal conflict, continuing command discord, and political intrigue.
In Autumn of Glory, the final volume of Thomas Lawrence Connelly's definitive history of one of the Confederacy's two major military forces, Connelly analyzes the factors underlying the army's failure during the last two years of the Civil War.
The army's military operations--including such major battles and campaigns as Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, Kennesaw Mountain, Peachtree Creek, Atlanta, Ezra Church, Jonesboro, and Bentonville--are viewed in perspective with its growing internal problems and the personality peculiarities of its commanders.
In late 1863 a well-organized movement within the army against General Bragg failed. After his departure, a semblance of the anti-Bragg organization still remained, and subsequently the army's leadership became embroiled in national Confederate politics. Connelly traces these growing problems of command discord and political intrigue and examines their disastrous effects upon the army's political fortunes.
Connelly's first volume, Army of the Heartland, explores the military significance of the heartland of the Confederacy and covers the army's operations from 1861 to late 1862. With the completion of these two volumes, the author has narrowed the historiographical gap between Lee's Army of Virginia and the Confederacy's other army. Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee, 1862-1865
After 42 years, Autumn of Glory remains the best book on the Army of Tennessee. It presents in-depth and insightful analysis of the army's single biggest problem, its own neurotic and hyper-contentious leadership. I'm now re-reading the chapters on the Atlanta campaign, where Professor Connelly depicts both the army's military activities and the behind-the-scenes maneuvering by Hood, Bragg and others to undermine Joe Johnston. Connelly does not whitewash Johnston either. He is unsparing in his appraisal of Johnston's near-disaster at Snake Creek Gap, inability to cope with Sherman's flanking maneuvers, failures to communicate his plans to Jefferson Davis (because, says Prof. Connelly, Johnston didn't know what his plans were) and lack of a viable plan to hold Atlanta. While I no longer agree with much of Connelly's assessment of John Bell Hood, it is a powerful assessment, one perhaps influenced by its times, that makes Hood into a character out of Dr. Strangelove. Hood deserves better, although even dissenters must respect Connelly's thoughtful appraisal.
The book would be better if its maps were more complete (although they are generally adequate) and if Connelly gave us more information on what the federals were doing. For example, in the Chickamauga chapters we learn only that the Union left collapses. Connelly doesn't tell us quite how the collapse happens. In the Atlanta chapters Connelly could have given a clearer picture of where the federals were, what they were doing and in what strength. His description and analysis of Confederate dispositions, strength, morale, command decisions and supply considerations are excellent.
A strength of the books is that Connelly sees both sides of questions and helps the reader appreciate the Army of Tennessee's many dilemmas. Connelly is aware of Leonidas Polk's military failings but convincingly argues that his loss deprived the army of one of its most experienced commanders. He details Joe Johnston's deficiencies yet makes the case that the removal at the time it was done was a mistake. At the same time Connelly shows us why Davis took that drastic step. In my view only Connelly's treatment of Hood is in need of significant revision.
This book more than stands the test of time. It is still the gold standard on the Army of Tennessee. All in all, well deserving of five stars. 9780807127384 A detailed look at the war in the West from the perspective of the commander and his subordinates. The petty infighting and the loss of perspective of the people managing the Confederate conflict as the disorganization of real command led to a number of disappointing setbacks.
This is a book not of how the North won, but of how the South lost. 9780807127384 Way too much perspective from only the generals' point of view for my taste. Almost no content from the point of view of the front line private soldier, which I enjoy the most. You can tell that Connelly researched the correspondence and original sources very meticulously, and did like how he utilized the fog of war perspective, debunking many post-war revisions based on what was known by whom at exactly what point in time. Looking at military decisions with this in mind, many of them that looked bad or incorrect after the fact, do start to make some more sense. 9780807127384 I do wish I could rate this classic much higher. Alas, I have some great reservations. The book is ENTIRELY about the generals and their squabbles. Just about no one comes off as competent; instead we have a series of self-important idiots fighting over...well who knows why they are fighting. You start to think the average Rebel soldier must be a fool to follow the likes of Bragg, Polk, Johnston, Hood, Hardee, etc.
Perhaps they were. Certainly Connelly never explains why they did. So instead we have a parade of failure, a kind of great chain of idiocy. The narrative is dry and staid, with flashes of brilliant observation, although every plan has some flaw that the general does not recognize. While true, here it gets as predictable. You can almost see it coming and know that this will be just another reason for another terrible defeat.
Now, if you want to know about army politics and back-biting, this book has no equal. Indeed, it ought to be required reading for any organization wracked by in-fighting. In the end, I liked volume one better. True, the prose was no better there, but it was for my money more original. It was less detailed, but Autumn of Glory is a wonderful example of detail for detail's sake and its numbing effects.
Am I too harsh? Maybe. The information here is good. I just think it needed an editor. There is a great book inside this one. 9780807127384